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MANSMANN,  Circuit Judge. 
 In this appeal from the district court's order revoking 
Manfred DeRewal's probation, we address chiefly DeRewal's primary 
contention regarding the tension between the power of the 
judiciary to act on probation matters and the executive branch's 
power governing parole since DeRewal was on parole when the 
district court revoked DeRewal's probation that had not yet 
begun.  This is an issue we specifically reserved in United 
States v. Camarata, 828 F.2d 974 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 
484 U.S. 1069 (1988). 
 We hold that the district court properly exercised its 
jurisdiction in revoking DeRewal's probation for pre-probation 
conduct occurring during a period of parole.  Such judicial 
action regarding probation does not disturb the executive 
branch's authority to control DeRewal's parole.   
 DeRewal also contends that the conditions of his 
probation were modified without a hearing as required by Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(b), that the district court erred 
in refusing to grant him access to the probation officer's entire 
file, and that there was insufficient evidence for the district 
court to find a violation of probation.  We have considered each 
of the allegations of error and, finding them to be without 
substance, we will affirm the order of the district court. 
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I. 
 In March, 1988, Manfred DeRewal was charged with 
conspiracy to import P2P, importation of P2P, and attempting to 
import P2P into the United States from Costa Rica in violation of 
21 U.S.C.A. §§  952(a), 960(a)(1), 963 (West 1981) and 18 
U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 1969).  Following conviction, DeRewal was 
sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment followed by a ten year term 
of special parole.  A five year probationary term was to run 
consecutively to the term of special parole.1 
 On December 17, 1992, DeRewal was released from prison 
on parole, parole to run until October 18, 1998.  The term of 
special parole would then run from 1998 until 2008, when the 
probationary period would begin. 
 On September 7, 1994, the United States Probation 
Department filed a Violation of Probation Petition against 
DeRewal, alleging that he had violated those three conditions of 
probation which required him (1) to answer truthfully inquiries 
from and follow the instructions of his probation officer; (2) to 
refrain from associating with those engaged in criminal activity 
or convicted of a felony; and (3) to refrain from violating any 
law. 
                                                           
1
 DeRewal's direct appeal from the judgment of conviction 
and sentence was affirmed on October 12, 1989.  DeRewal then 
filed a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 raising ineffective 
assistance of counsel and other claims.  The district court 
denied the petition.  On appeal, we affirmed in part, reversed in 
part, and remanded the matter to the district court.  See United 
States v. DeRewal, 10 F.3d 100 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that a 
defendant is not required to show "cause and prejudice" with 
respect to his failure to raise ineffective assistance of counsel 
on direct appeal). 
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 DeRewal's motion to dismiss the petition for lack of 
jurisdiction was dismissed and a hearing was held on the merits 
of the Probation Department's Petition.  DeRewal filed a motion 
seeking to review his probation file in its entirety.  Following 
the district court's denial of this motion, the government 
presented the testimony of DeRewal's neighbor who had overheard 
telephone conversations as a result of an illegal splice into her 
telephone line.  Testimony was also given by telephone employees, 
DeRewal's probation officer, and FBI agents. 
 At the conclusion of the testimony, the district court 
found that DeRewal had violated the terms of his probation and 
sentenced him to 36 months imprisonment.  This timely appeal 
followed in which we confront the issue of judicial power to 
alter probation during a pre-probation period of parole which is 
governed by the authority of the executive branch. 
 
II. 
 In Affronti v. United States, 350 U.S. 79 (1955), the 
Supreme Court confronted the question of whether a district court 
has authority to place a defendant on probation once he has begun 
to serve the first in a series of consecutive sentences.  The 
Court cautioned that statutory authority to grant probation 
should not be "applied in such a way as to necessarily overlap 
the parole and executive clemency provisions of the law" and 
should be interpreted "to avoid interference with the parole and 
clemency powers of the Executive Board."  Affronti, 350 U.S. at 
83.  The Court then concluded, utilizing broad language, that 
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"the probationary power ceases with respect to all of the 
sentences composing a single cumulative sentence immediately upon 
imprisonment for any part of the cumulative sentence."  Id. 
 In United States v. Williams, 15 F.3d 1356, 1357 (6th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 431 (1991), the Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit concluded that "a district court does have 
authority to revoke probation for pre-probation conduct, 
including the pre-probation conduct of a paroled convict."  On 
facts substantially identical to those present_" 
